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A survey on hedging markets in 
Asia: a description of Asian derivatives 
markets from a practical perspective 
Martin Hohensee and Kyungjik Lee 
Introduction 
Since the Asian crisis, there has been tremendous growth in Asian bond markets that, in 
many cases, has not been matched with commensurate growth in derivative products. For 
those markets that grew out of the financial sector recapitalisation prior to the middle of 2003, 
there was precious little experience of bearish bond market movement, and therefore 
perhaps inadequate appreciation of the importance of hedging instruments at that time. 
However, while liquid hedging instruments may not be strictly necessary for the formation of 
a bond market, they are recognised as critical to its long-run success. The movement of 
Asian central banks to better develop fixed income markets should therefore also endeavour 
to strengthen the development of derivatives markets. As a first step in this effort, we present 
below a description of the current state of hedging markets in the region. 
The current state and future potential of Asian derivatives markets 
Many Asian currency and interest rate derivatives markets are still in the very early stages of 
development, while others boast a relatively broad range of derivative products. We find that 
there exists a strong inverse relationship between market sophistication and regulatory 
restrictions. The two top financial centres in the region, Hong Kong SAR and Singapore, 
undoubtedly have the most advanced derivatives markets with the least regulation, while at 
the other end of the spectrum are China and Indonesia who lag behind most of their Asian 
neighbours. Other countries fall somewhere in between, as depicted below. 
Level of restrictions vs market sophistication 
 
































 262  BIS Papers No 30
 
The development of the underlying bond market is surely one of the key factors in the growth 
of the derivatives market. Since the financial crisis, Asian local bond markets have grown 
rapidly and the size of nine East Asian local bond markets was estimated to be USD 1.2trn at 
the end of 2002. In comparison with the more developed economies, however, bond markets 
remain small. The total East Asian bond market, in fact, amounts to only about 20% of the 
Japanese market. The average size of the bond market in those countries was 46% of GDP, 
compared to 169% in Japan and 156% in the United States, suggesting continued high 
growth potential in the years to come.
1 In order to grow an institutional investor base, 
particularly an international one, the depth and breadth of the bond market will need to 
increase, inevitably entailing improvements in the liquidity and diversity of available hedging 
tools. Regulators in many countries have been moving toward increasing support for 
derivative products, but there are still apparent inconsistencies in policy approaches. In many 
countries, the ability to maintain currency stability has been an important regulatory 
consideration since the 1997 Asian crisis. Different policy reactions to the currency 
speculation during the crisis and the subsequent high level of FX volatility have set the pace 
for the capital market liberalisation. For example, under the strict IMF program, Korea has 
been aggressive in liberalising capital flows while Malaysia reversed its policy to a tightly 
controlled capital account regime.
2 Although several countries still maintain strict FX 
regulations, strong regional recovery and rapid accumulation of the FX reserves bode well for 
further liberalisation of the Asian currency markets. 
Asian FX reserves 
Source: CEIC and IMF. 
FX derivatives 
The degree of regulatory restrictions varies widely across the region; however, the common 
purpose of FX control is to protect the local currency from speculation. Therefore, the most 
frequent form of FX regulation is to impose hedging requirements on the FX trades. The 
authorities often apply stricter rules to non-resident trades. Any restrictions on free capital 
                                                  
1 ADB  (2003). 
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mobility can create inefficiencies by not allowing market participants to take full advantage of 
pricing differences. This is unfortunate since foreign participation could be an important 
catalyst for the growth of Asian bond and derivatives markets, especially in the early stages. 
Since restrictions on FX derivatives transactions have a direct result on the formation of other 
derivatives markets, they represent an appropriate place to start our survey of derivatives 
markets. 
Hong Kong 
Despite the fixed exchange rate regime, Hong Kong has the most liquid and efficient 
FX market in the region. There are no restrictions on the onshore FX derivatives market in 
Hong Kong. Foreigners can freely trade in the onshore market, so there has not been a need 
for a non-deliverable forwards (NDF) market in HKD. The FX forward market is used to 
hedge currency exposure on liabilities and assets, as well as to speculate on the yield curve 
movements. The market is very liquid up to one-year maturity. The one-year USD/HKD 
forward, which generally reflects market sentiment on the currency peg, is watched closely 
by the market and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA). Despite the fixed exchange 
rate, the one-year USD/HKD premium has actually been quite volatile in recent years. Local 
economic news, comments from senior officials in Hong Kong or China on the subject of the 
linked exchange rate, and comments from international rating agencies are some of the 
factors that have influenced the forward premium in the past. In 2003 alone, it went from 
+350 pips when SARS hit Hong Kong in early 2003, to below –600 pips because of a flood 
on liquidity into the economy following the September 2003 G10 meeting which increased 
expectations of a regional currency realignment. 
One-year USD/HKD forward premium 
 
Source: DB Global Markets Research. 
Singapore 
The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) has continued to drive the expansion in the FX 
derivatives market through liberalisation. For example, in 2002, the MAS revised Notice 757 
to allow non-residents to transact freely in SGD FX options without filing documentation on 
the purpose of each transaction. However, a few basic restrictions still apply to protect the 
currency from speculation. For example, banks’ lending to non-resident financial institutions 
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Korea 
In 1999, Korea lifted most of the existing restrictions on the FX market, but has recently 
reversed some of this liberalisation. Prior to 1999, all forward FX transactions required 
certification as hedges against expected current account transactions. The onshore forward 
market is highly liquid out to one year, but supporting documentation is required if there is to 
be a physical delivery. Unlike Singapore or Hong Kong, Korea maintains an NDF market 
where onshore banks are also permitted to participate with other banks or corporates. No 
prior reports or approvals are required for NDF transactions. The regulatory environment 
suddenly tightened in January 2004 in order to discourage offshore investors’ speculative 
demand for KRW. The government put a ceiling on domestic financial institutions’ NDF 
positions with non-residents. Local financial institutions were originally banned from 
increasing net long dollar positions via NDF trades by more than 10%, or decreasing net 
short positions by more than 10%, based on their position on 14 January and 16 January 
2004 respectively. Later, the restriction was mitigated for net short dollar positions. For FX 
options, the up-front premium should be under 20% of option notional amount, otherwise 
prior approval from the Bank of Korea (BoK) is required. If there is to be a physical delivery at 
the options maturity, the underlying trade documentation must comply with regulations on 
forward transactions. The currency options market is also liquid, volume of about USD 250m 
traded in the non-deliverable options (NDO) market. 
Taiwan, China 
The primary goal of the Central Bank of China (CBC) is to prevent speculative activity in the 
currency market to maintain the financial stability of Taiwan, China (hereinafter referred to as 
Taiwan). Maintaining export competitiveness against countries such as Japan and Korea is 
also a major concern for the authorities. The CBC manages the currency via capital controls 
and direct intervention, which is supported by its substantial foreign exchange reserves. 
Onshore FX spot, forwards and options trades must be explicitly approved by the relevant 
regulatory authority. Non-residents are not allowed to access the onshore deliverable market, 
preventing arbitrage flows in the onshore FX and interest rate markets. Liquidity in the NDF 
market is relatively good, but onshore banks are not allowed to book an NDF trade with 
onshore corporates. 
Thailand 
In January 1998, the Bank of Thailand (BoT) lifted a number of measures imposed previously 
to stem FX speculation. In particular, domestic financial institutions were allowed to engage 
in spot transactions involving THB with non-residents so that the onshore and offshore spot 
THB FX markets became reunited. To safeguard against speculation in the FX market, 
however, credit facilities provided by each financial institution to non-residents where there is 
no underlying trade or investment activity in Thailand are subject to a maximum outstanding 
limit of THB  50m per counterparty. There are no size restrictions on hedging short THB 
forward positions, however. In an effort to curb speculative capital inflows, the BoT recently 
introduced new measures. Effective as of 12 September 2003, onshore banks were banned 
from borrowing more than THB 50m from each non-resident without underlying transactions 
for less than three months, including transactions similar to borrowing such as buying FX 
forwards and selling/buying FX swaps. On 14 October 2003, additional measures were 
introduced to prevent THB speculation. The key changes were: (i) the outstanding 
non-resident THB balance cannot exceed THB 300m per account and (ii) non-resident THB 
accounts are locked in for at least six months without interest. 
Malaysia 
In Malaysia, strict capital controls were imposed in September 1998 to insulate Malaysia 
from the financial crisis. The government still maintains some strict regulations on the BIS Papers No 30  265
 
currency market. Hedging of foreign exchange exposure must be related to trade activities 
and cannot exceed a tenor of one year. Non-residents can only access the onshore forward 
market for the purpose of purchasing MYR securities listed on the KLSE. Financial hedging 
(for example, hedging of profit repatriation, loan payment) is not allowed without Bank 
Negara Malaysia (BNM)’s prior approval. An NDF market is not regularly available for MYR. 
Indonesia 
Under the IMF program, Indonesia’s FX policy has been directed at preventing extreme volatility 
in the currency. The Bank Indonesia (BI) tightened capital control in January 2001 by issuing 
regulations prohibiting IDR transfers to offshore entities, unless supported by underlying trade or 
investment transactions. These restrictions quickly spawned the development of an NDF market 
starting in February 2001. Main hedgers are corporates, but hedge trades are somewhat 
uncommon, due to high negative carry.3 Liquidity in the onshore and offshore market is generally 
low. With the exit from the IMF program at the end of 2003, and inflation trending lower, the Bank 
Indonesia may move back to a more liberal exchange rate regime. 
Philippines 
In the Philippines, Banko Sentral Ng Pilipinas (BSP) operates a managed floating exchange 
rate regime in which capital controls, close observation of market positions and intermittent 
interventions are used to prevent speculative activity. Corporates are the main hedgers for their 
USD loans. Liquidity in both the spot and forward markets is generally quite low. Poor liquidity 
and instability in the Philippines have led to squeezes in the peso market. The basic principle 
of the BSP in managing foreign exchange is that, outside of the banking system, foreign 
currency may be freely bought and sold against the peso. Hence, there is no prohibition 
against, for example, exporters selling their USD directly to importers or even to private 
investors. FX regulations therefore focus primarily on bank transactions, and the specific rules 
and restrictions depend on the nature of the transaction as well as the type of counterparty. In 
general, onshore banks may buy foreign currency from both onshore and offshore 
counterparties, without prior BSP approval or any documentation requirements. An onshore 
interbank FX options market does not exist and even the offshore market is mainly inactive. 
India 
Historically, India experienced substantial ongoing fiscal deficits and persistent current 
account deficits. Consequently, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) maintained capital controls 
in an attempt to prevent speculative activity in the rupee market. In recent years, however, 
the underlying economic conditions have changed dramatically. India now runs a surplus 
current account and substantial capital inflows have allowed foreign exchange reserves to 
balloon. The RBI has therefore eased several restrictions and allowed FX derivative trades 
for hedging purposes, and the trend towards further flexibility is expected to continue. Most 
recently, RBI decided to permit foreign currency/rupee options as of 7 July 2003 in order to 
further develop the derivatives market in India and expand the spectrum of hedging products 
for currency exposure. Authorised dealers can offer plain vanilla European options and 
customers can purchase call or put options. The writing of options by customers is not 
permitted. As in the FX spot and forward markets, customers who have genuine foreign 
currency exposures are eligible to enter into options contracts, and authorised dealers can 
use the product for the purpose of hedging trading books and balance sheet exposure. FX 
options trading is still thin, however. 
                                                  
3  The academic evidence strongly rejects the hypothesis that the forward exchange rate is an unbiased 
predictor of the future spot rate. Currencies that trade at a forward discount, on average, weaken less than the 


























A summary of Asian FX derivatives markets 
  HKD SGD KRW TWD THB MYR  INR  IDR  PHP CNY 
F X   f o r w a r d             













Liquidity  Good Good Good Good Good Good Good Average  Average   
Trade size  USD 20-50m  USD 25m  USD 10-20m USD 1-10m  USD 5-20m  USD 10-20m  USD 1-5m  USD 0.5-30m USD 2-5m   
B/as spread  0.0005-0.0010  0.0002-0.0010 0.3-1.0  0.002-0.020 0.01-0.100  0.0005  0.03-0.05 10-80  0.02-0.25  
Daily volume USD 3-5bn  USD 6bn  USD 1bn  USD 500-700m USD 300-600m USD 100-200m USD 150m  USD 200m  USD 75m   
FX  options           
Restriction  None None Minimal  Prior 
approval 
   Offer 
restricted 





Trade size  USD 25-50m  Up to 
USD 30m 
USD 20-50m USD 20m  No interbank Just allowed USD 0.5-3m
B/as spread  0.2-0.5 vol  0.5-1.0 vol  1 vol  0.3-1.0 vol      5-7 vol 
Daily volume USD 50-100m  USD 50 m  USD 50m  USD 50m   
Market 
non-existent





NDF         
Restriction None  Interbank 
only 
None None None Interbank 
only 
Liquidity  Good Good  Good Average  Average  Good 
Trade size  USD 5-10m  USD 3-10m  USD 3-5m  USD 3m  USD 2-5m  USD 5-10m 



































Table 1 (cont) 
A summary of Asian FX derivatives markets 
  HKD SGD KRW TWD THB MYR  INR  IDR  PHP CNY 
N D O           
Restriction None  Interbank 
only 
None  None None None Interbank 
only 
Liquidity  Good  Good  Good  Average Average Average Average 
Trade size  USD 20-50m USD 30m  USD 20m  USD 5m  USD 5m  USD 5m  USD 10-20m 






USD 250m  USD 150m  USD 50m 
Market 
non-existent
Irregular Irregular Irregular USD  250m 
Source: DB Global Markets Research. 
  
268  BIS Papers No 30
 
China 
Foreign exchange policy in China is determined by the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) and 
managed by the State Administration for Foreign Exchange (SAFE). Despite becoming a 
major player in global commerce, the Chinese economy in aggregate remains relatively 
closed. However, strong global pressure on its currency will likely lead to a more flexible 
currency regime in China sooner or later. Although China prefers gradual reform, the officials 
made it clear that they wish to liberalise the capital account with the goal of developing a 
sophisticated financial sector and an independent monetary policy. Currently, designated 
onshore banks and authorised foreign banks are allowed to participate in the FX spot market. 
For current account items, relevant documentation is required for transactions of over 
USD 1m cumulative amount, while capital account items require pre-approval from the local 
SAFE. Only the Bank of China can offer CNY deliverable forwards with the tenor out to 6M. 
An active market for CNY NDFs exists, however, onshore corporates are not allowed to take 
part in the market. 
Exchange-traded rate futures markets 
Appreciating the importance of adequate hedging instruments for dealers and investors, 
particularly in bear markets, many countries in the region have devoted effort to developing 
exchange-traded derivatives markets. As of March 2004, six Asian countries have interest 
rate and/or bond futures markets, namely Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia 
and India. These efforts have met with varying degrees of success, as described below. 
Hong Kong 
The three-year HKD bond futures is one of the few that is settled by physical delivery (the 
other being the 10-year TWD contract). Exchange fund notes (EFNs) issued by the HKMA 
are reference instruments for the contract. On the Hong Kong Futures Exchange one-month 
Hibor futures, three-month Hibor futures and three-year EFN futures are traded. The liquidity 
in each of these contracts has declined in recent years, disappointing expectations, probably 
due to limited foreign participation and already good liquidity in the OTC derivatives market. 
Table 2 
Open interest for HKD interest rate futures 






End-2001 750  58,830  375 
End-2002 20  13,806  0 
11 March 2004  55  6,172  300 
Source: Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited. 
 
Singapore 
Currently, there are two exchange-traded interest rate futures products in Singapore: three-
month swap offer rate (SOR) futures and the five-year bond futures. The SOR is an FX 
forward-implied interest rate calculated from three-month USD/SGD forwards, and an official 
fixing is provided by the Association of Banks in Singapore. Trading in three-month SOR  
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futures has been sporadic, and the market has been inactive recently with open interest only 
at 5,000 contracts in 2002. Possible reasons could be: (i) local corporates are generally 
cash-rich and do not need to borrow much short-term cash, and/or (ii) with rates trending 
lower for the past couple of years, hedging borrowing needs has not been a real concern. 
The five-year bond futures market was launched in June 2001, but the trading has slowed to 
nearly nothing. One explanation may be that the investor base in government bonds is 
skewed towards banks, who have strong credit and ample access to OTC derivatives. In 
recent years, the basis risk between bonds and swaps has been small, and spreads have 
been tight. Hedging in the OTC market therefore has provided an efficient, liquid and cost 
efficient hedge. 
Taiwan 
The Taiwan Financial Futures Exchange introduced government bond contracts only in early 
2004 but these have not taken off. Whether the reason is the sharp liquidity and accessibility 
differences between on- and off-the-run bonds, reflecting institutional investors’ propensity to 
hold bonds to maturity, high transaction costs or other factors, is not clear. Neither a 
narrowing of the maturity range for deliverable securities nor the removal of the penalty for 
cash settlement has improved liquidity. At the short end of the maturity spectrum, the futures 
contract based on 30-day commercial paper has also fizzled. In this case, the choice of 
30- rather than 90-day paper seems unfortunate in retrospect. The floating leg of interest rate 
swaps, for instance, is based on 90-day yields. 
Malaysia 
In March 2002, the Malaysian Derivatives Exchange (MDEX) launched Malaysia’s first bond 
futures contract, with the five-year government bond being the underlying security. The 
contract has similar specifications to the five-year bond futures in Singapore, using a basket 
of bonds in pricing and being cash settled. Activity in the contract is not great with average 
daily volume or open interest rarely moving above 1,000 contracts. The use of the futures 
contract as a hedge for cash bond positions is small. Other futures products in Malaysia are 
three-year and 10-year bond futures, launched in September 2003, and three-month KLibor 
futures, launched in March 1996. As in the case of the five-year bond futures, liquidity 
remains poor. 
  
Singapore five-year bond futures  Malaysia five-year bond futures 
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Five-year MGS futures: open interest
Five-year MGS futures: volume  
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Korea 
The shining success story among the exchange-traded futures markets is clearly the cash 
settled three-year Korean Treasury bond (KTB) futures contract. To some degree, the 
success of the three-year bond futures in Korea could actually be attributable to lack of 
transparency in the bond market and limited availability of alternative hedging tools. Over 
time, improved liquidity in the underlying bond market and strong foreign interest have 
effectively accelerated the growth of the futures market. According to the World Bank,
4 the 
three-year KTB futures is the sixth most active interest rate futures contract by trading 
volume. Banks and ITCs are the two main participants in the market with a combined share 
of 50-60%. Despite the fact that foreigners trade only around 10% of the total volume, they 
seem to play an important role in catalysing the development of the market. Their activities 
are closely monitored by domestic players, since they are often viewed as more 
sophisticated. Foreigners may find it easier to trade futures than cash bonds due to taxation, 
leverage and liquidity issues. The fact that foreigners’ net open interest is as much as 30% of 
the market compared to less than 1% holding in cash bonds would strengthen the argument. 
In value terms, foreign net open interest typically ranges between 0.5  to 2.0% of the 
government bond market. 
 
Table 3 





Value of foreigners’ 
net open interest 
Cash bond 
outstanding 
% to cash 
market 
10-30% 60,000  contracts  KRW  0.5-2.0trn KRW  90trn 0.6-2.2% 
Source: Korea Futures Exchange. 
 
Three-month CD futures, one-year MSB futures and five-year KTB futures are also listed on 
the Korea Futures Exchange (KOFEX), but they are totally inactive at the moment. 
India 
India launched 10-year bond futures in June 2003. One unique feature is that the settlement 
price is based on the value of the notional bond, derived from the zero-coupon curve which 
the National Stock Exchange of India (NSE) publishes every day. To date, this product has 
been a failure. In fact, in less than three months after the launch, trading in bond futures 
literally stopped. There may be several ways to explain this. First, the unique settlement price 
calculation adds complication, and is seen by many investors as an opaque “black box”. 
Moreover, the basis risk between the NSE curve and the cash prices could also be 
substantial and unpredictable. Finally, restrictions on short selling and requiring financial 
institutions to use derivatives only for hedging purposes could account for the inactivity of the 
product. In this case, the absence of speculators may be cheating the market out of badly 
needed liquidity. 
 
                                                  
4  OECD-World Bank Annual Bond Market Forum, 3 June 2003, Emerging Derivative Markets presented by 
Oliver Fratzscher.  
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Table 4 
Indian bond futures trading 
  Jun 03  Jul  Aug  Sep  Dec  Feb 04 
Number  of  days    5    23  20   22   22   19 
Number of contracts 
traded    9,768   963  50   0   0   0 
Source: National Stock Exchange of India. 
 
Taiwan 
The Taiwan Futures Exchange (TAIFEX) launched 10-year bond futures in January 2004. 
The contract is settled with physical delivery of bonds maturing between seven and 11 years, 
much like the very successful 10-year Japanese Government bond futures contract. In order 
to prevent short squeezes on the cheapest and to deliver bonds around the final settlement 
date, TAIFEX simultaneously opened a Bond Lending Center. TAIFEX hoped that by 
providing effective hedging tools, the launching of bond futures would attract more foreign 
funds into the Taiwan bond market. This may eventually take place; however, the initial 
market reaction was not very enthusiastic. So far, open interest has stayed below 1,000 
contracts. 
OTC interest rate derivatives
5 
Interest rate swaps 
Hong Kong 
Based on the most recent survey done by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), 
interest rate swaps (IRSs) represent the largest segment (over 73%) of interest rate 
derivative transactions in Hong Kong. With about HKD 9.1bn in daily turnover, the liquidity in 
the IRS market is far better than the Exchange Fund Note (EFN) market whose daily 
turnover is about HKD 2.5bn. HKD swap spreads are among the widest in Asia. While EFNs 
are consistently well supported by strong demand from local banks, HKD swaps are much 
more sensitive to the volatile risk premium of the currency peg. In addition, the 10-year HKD 
swap spread tends to be persistently tight, especially right after the issuance of a new 10-
year EFN. In order to reduce the interest cost of the 10-year paper in an environment of 
upward sloping yield curve, the HKMA has consistently swapped the 10-year EFN into a 
floater after the issuance, creating downward pressure on the 10-year part of the HKD swap 
curve. 
Singapore 
Interest rate swaps are also more liquid than government bonds in Singapore. The floating 
leg of an IRS trade is the swap offer rate (SOR) posted by the Association of Banks in 
Singapore. (It is an FX-implied rate, in contrast to a Libor-type fixing in typical G7 trades. 
Many countries in Asia are following this model for developing their own interest rate swap 
                                                  
5  Cross-currency swap, a hedging instrument for FX risk, is included here due to its similar trading patterns.  
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market, for lack of a well developed money market.) Corporations are the main hedgers in 
the swap market, while hedge funds often come in for speculation as well as relative value 
investments. The MAS has recognised that hedge funds can offer diversification from more 
traditional funds, and help Singapore develop into an international financial centre. This 
recognition led to the MAS introducing legislation to allow retail hedge funds to be offered to 
the local market. Swap spreads have been generally market-directional and more so for 
long-dated tenors. In other words, swap spreads tend to widen when rates rise and tighten 
when they fall. There also exists an overnight interest rate swap (OIS) market, with the first 
trade done in April 2000. In 2002, the government removed the restrictions in the cross-
currency swap market. Previously, cross-currency swap could not be traded without 
economic activity associated with the trade. 
Korea 
During the first half of 2003, interest rate swaps held 88% share of total OTC interest rate 
derivatives trades in Korea.
6 However, compared to bond futures, turnover of interest rate 
swaps is relatively small and volatile. Very recently, daily trading volume has decreased to 
less than KRW 0.3trn. 
Table 5 
Daily turnover for KRW bonds, futures and swaps 
KRW trillion 






2002  5.9  2.0 2.3 0.8 
1H  2003 6.6  2.3 2.5 0.9 
Sources: Financial Supervisory Service; KoreaBondWeb. 
 
The relative illiquidity of swaps partly stems from the underdeveloped short-term benchmark 
rates in Korea. Interest rate swaps use the three-month CD rate as the floating rate, but CDs 
are not liquid in the secondary market. The BoK plans to introduce Libor-type interbank rates 
in 2H 2004, which will help step up the liquidity of swap trades. IRS trades up to 10 years 
with a bid/ask spread of 5 bps up to five years and 10 bps for longer tenors. 
Trading in OTC derivatives increased in 2001, fuelled by the increased interest in structured 
products. Since then, in order to enhance returns, investors welcomed structured products 
whose performance was linked to future market direction or the shape of the yield curve. The 
most popular products were dual index floaters and inverse floaters, based on constant 
maturity treasury (CMT) or constant maturity swap (CMS) rates as the reference rates. 
The Korean IRS market is highly driven by technicals that may not be reflected in the cash 
market. The spread between bond yields and swaps (the bond/swap basis) can be quite 
volatile, as seen in the chart below. Swaps, therefore, can be a relatively risky hedging tool 
for investors. 
A USD/KRW cross-currency swap (CCS) can be structured out to 10 years, but one to five 
years are more actively traded tenors. Exporters’ USD forward selling and the central bank’s 
                                                  
6  Financial Supervisory Service, internal data.  
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FX intervention are the main drivers in the short end of the cross-currency curve, while 
external debt issuers and investors generally trade in the long end. 
The spread between the CCS and IRS rates (the IRS/CCS basis) has also been volatile in 
recent years. For the past couple of years, the CCS market has been dominated by domestic 
investors’ KRW-receiving demand to swap their offshore investment into KRW. Many swap 
dealers who could not hedge their position in the CCS market hedged their position in the 
relatively more liquid IRS market, running this IRS/CCS basis risk in order to increase market 
share with asset swapping investors. With continued receiving demand in the CCS market, 
however, dealers were eventually squeezed out of this basis risk, in late February 2003. As a 
result of massive unwinding demand, - paying IRS and receiving CCS - five-year IRS/CCS 
basis had widened to almost 200 bps before it came down to more reasonable levels. 
Foreigners can participate in the swap market using non-deliverable IRS or CCS and current 
participation is estimated to be 15%. 
Korea five-year swap spread  Korea five-year IRS/CCS basis 
Taiwan 
The Taiwan swap market has been affected by some of same dynamics that have affected 
Korea’s. Interest rate swaps trade up to 10 years and the floating rate index is the Taiwan CP 
rate. Currency swaps are quoted against six-month US Libor and the approval from CBC is 
required for onshore entities to transact in the onshore CCS market. In recent years, with 
interest rates declining, investors increased buying offshore debt and swapped cash flows 
into TWD to achieve their yield targets. These activities, combined with multilateral entities’ 
swapping TWD-denominated debt into major currencies, tended to widen out the IRS/CCS 
basis. Foreigners can participate in non-deliverable IRS or CCS market where cash flows are 
net settled in USD, although liquidity is generally low. 
Thailand 
In Thailand, the dynamics of the bond/swap basis is slightly unusual. First, the onshore IRS 
market adopts the onshore FX forward-implied yield (THBFIX) as the floating rate index. The 
basis between onshore CCS and IRS curves is thus minimal, and any cross-currency asset 
or liability swapping activity, therefore, directly affects the government bond/IRS basis. Since 
the cross-currency swap uses USD Libor as its floating rate index, the onshore bond/swap 
basis should theoretically be exactly equal to the Kingdom of Thailand’s USD swap spreads. 
Following this theoretical argument, the THB IRS curve should be below the government 
bond curve to reflect a positive USD Libor margin for the Kingdom. However, this turns out 
not to be the case. An asset swap of Thailand’s offshore 2007 bond has always offered 
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Five-year IRS/CCS basis 
Source: DB Global Markets Research.  Source: DB Global Markets Research.  
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This is because the linkage between onshore and offshore capital markets is tightly 
regulated. Onshore investors have only a limited ability to asset swap USD paper into THB 
on a case-by-case basis, while foreign entities are currently prohibited from issuing bonds in 
the onshore market. Only a few state-owned enterprises have been allowed an opportunity to 
liability swap THB borrowings into USD. With only limited ability to engage in asset/liability 
arbitrage, the market cannot force a convergence of credit pricing in THB and USD. As long 
as cross-border restrictions on issuers and investors exist, those who are granted permission 
will systematically have an opportunity to create cheap THB assets from USD assets, or 
cheap USD liabilities from THB liabilities. The easing of the regulatory environment has been 
slow so far. 
KoT 2007 swapped into THB minus 
interpolated onshore government bond yield
Source: DB Global Markets Research. 
Malaysia 
With strict government regulation of the currency market, a cross-currency swap market does 
not exist in Malaysia. The only active OTC derivative product in the onshore market is the 
interest rate swap. Liquidity has improved over the years, but the average trade size is still 
small at MYR 10m. The most liquid part of the curve is up to three years with a bid/ask 
spread of 5 bps. Commercial banks, finance companies and merchant banks are the 
predominant users of the swap market. Given the illiquid nature of the long-term fixed rate 
assets such as commercial loans, banks with an expectation of higher interest rates are likely 
to hedge in the swap market rather than to sell such assets outright. 
Indonesia 
In Indonesia, there is no developed IRS market trading onshore at the moment. However, 
banks are interested in hedging their liabilities, from fixed to floating or floating to fixed 
depending on their situation. As a result, some swap trades were done using the IDRFIX
7 
and three-month sale offering of the Bank Indonesia Certificate (SBI) rate as floating rate. 
                                                  
7  IDR interest rate fixing  = {([1+(FWD/SPOT)] x [1+(SIBOR x DAYS/360)] – 1} x 360/DAYS 
  where   FWD = average of the offered side of the FX forward points from banks of each day 
  SPOT = average of mid spot rate provided by each bank 
  SIBOR = US interest rate for the respective tenor derived from Sibor 
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Philippines 
No offshore IRS market exists for the Philippines yet, but CCS does trade offshore, albeit 
with low liquidity. Onshore IRS was launched on 18 August 2003 among six foreign banks 
(Deutsche Bank, HSBC, Standard Chartered, Citibank, JP Morgan and ING). The market is 
still very illiquid with trading volume of around PHP 200m a week and a bid/ask spread 
ranging between 50-70 bps. But by the end of the first half of 2004, at least four local banks 
are expected to join the market, which should improve the depth of the market. Standard 
tenors are one to five years and the typical trade size is PHP 50m. The floating leg is the 
three-month PHIREF or Philippine Interbank Reference Rate. The PHIREF is the implied 
peso rate derived from all dealt USD/PHP swap and forward interbank transactions. 
India 
In India, interest rate swaps were first allowed in July 1999. Since then, the OTC 
derivatives market has grown rapidly. Major hedgers are corporates and financial 
institutions (FIs). In the past, most hedging came from large borrowers converting fixed 
debts to floating. Historically, one of the major hurdles in developing the IRS market has 
been the lack of a liquid money market curve. Due to limited credit appetite and the capital 
constraints that banks face, the overnight market remains the deepest and the most liquid 
in the short end of the curve. The overnight rate has also been the most widely accepted 
benchmark for floating rate bond issues. As a result, overnight index swap (OIS) with the 
floating rate indexed to the overnight NSE Mumbai interbank offer rate (Mibor) was the 
most natural market to develop, and today enjoys high liquidity. Another interest rate swap 
indexed to the three-month or the six-month Mumbai interbank forward offer rate (Mifor) is 
also highly liquid, in fact far more liquid than OIS with 85% of the total swap trading 
volume. Although all of the cash flows are settled in INR, Mifor swap effectively becomes a 
CCS trade since the Mifor is essentially FX implied yield derived from onshore USD/INR 
forwards. 
An increasing number of banks, primary dealers and corporations are actively participating 
in the two swap markets. Both the OIS and Mifor curves are active up to five years with a 
bid/ask spread of around 5 bps up to five years and 15-20 bps for longer tenors. Lack of 
participation from large players, such as public sector banks (PSBs), mutual funds and 
insurance companies, is often pointed to as the hurdle to further development. In addition, 
corporations can use OTC derivatives only for hedging purposes while no such restrictions 
apply in the case of exchange-traded derivatives. One specific case is that corporates 
cannot cancel and rebook a currency swap. 
China 
Although offshore non-deliverable CCS trading is not entirely impossible for China, the 
main issue in the onshore Chinese market is how to develop the underlying bond market. 



























A summary of Asian IRS and CCS markets 
 HKD  SGD  KRW  TWD  THB  MYR  INR IDR  PHP  CNY 
Interest 
rate swap 
         
Floating 
rate 
















































HKD 200m  SGD 10-30m  KRW 10bn  TWD 300m  USD 10m  MYR 10m  INR 250m  PHP 50m 
Bid/ask 
spread 
10bp  2-5bp  5-10bp 5-10bp 10bp  5-15bp 5bp  50-70bp 
Daily 
volume 












































































Table 6 (cont) 
A summary of Asian IRS and CCS markets 
































USD 30m  SGD 20m  USD 10m  USD 10m  USD 10m  INR 250m  USD 3-5m 
Bid/ask 
spread 
10bp 2-4bp  5-10bp  10bp 10bp  5bp  60-110bp 
Daily 
volume 










Source: DB Global Markets Research. 
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Interest rate options 
According to a recent BIS report, interest rate contracts account for 71.8% of the global OTC 
derivatives market.
8 Particularly, interest rate swaps remain by far the largest single group of 
products in the OTC derivatives market, representing 56% across market risk categories. In 
the G10 countries that the BIS report covers, interest rate options are also popular, with 16% 
share in the total OTC derivatives market. However, except for a few countries such as Hong 
Kong and Singapore, interest rate options rarely trade in Asia. Among interest rate options 
products, swaptions are more actively traded in Asia than caps/floors, probably due to a lack 
of reliable benchmark short-term rates. Hong Kong has the most liquid interest rate options 
market in the region with average daily trading volume around HKD 500-600m. In Singapore, 
since the interest rate volatility market has begun to pick up since 2002, rates are quoted 
regularly in the broker market. The typical daily volume is about SGD 50-100m with foreign 
participation at about 5-10%. Although the market quotes swaptions with expirations out to 
five years, three-month and six-month swaptions are the most actively traded. Interest rate 
options markets also exist for KRW, TWD and THB, but trades are infrequent and volatile. 
KRW swaptions trade somewhere between two to three times a day to three times per week, 
and the trade size ranges from KRW 50bn to over KRW 1trn. Average trade size for TWD 
swaptions is TWD 1bn and trade happens about 10 times a month. For THB, trades are 




Since the mid-1990s, banks have been turning to credit derivatives to more actively manage 
the concentration and correlation risk inherent in their loan portfolios. But before the Russian 
default in August 1998, many investors viewed credit derivatives as a curious but highly 
specialised and exotic corner of the bond market. When suddenly faced with the prospect of 
deteriorating credits and bond market illiquidity worldwide following Russia’s default, 
investors could see in a very tangible way the attraction of a market where one can buy 
protection to reduce risk, and sell protection to diversify a dangerously concentrated portfolio. 
According to the latest British Bankers Association (BBA) credit derivatives report 
2001/2002,
11 the total notional outstanding for credit derivative products stood at 
USD  1.19trn at the end of 2001. By the end of 2004, the total notional outstanding is 
expected to increase to USD 4.8trn. Banks are the most important players in this market, 
capturing 52% of the protection buying and 39% of the protection selling. Among a variety of 
products, single name credit default swaps (CDSs) continued to be the most popular product 
with 45% of the market share in 2001. Sovereign single-name CDSs represents the most 
actively traded credit derivative instrument in emerging markets. There is an active broker 
market for Asian sovereign CDSs. Two-way pricing is generally available for the most liquid 
sovereign names in the one to 10 year range. The standard inter-dealer notional trade 
amount tends to be USD 5m. 
Credit derivatives provide many investment and hedging opportunities that are impossible in 
the cash market. Some general uses of credit derivatives in emerging markets include: 
                                                  
8 BIS  (2003). 
9  An estimate from Prebon Yamane Hong Kong. 
10  Xu and Wilder (2003). 
11  BBA publishes its report every two years. The latest available numbers are for the year 2001.  
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•  Given the difficulty in shorting bonds due to underdeveloped repo markets, hedging 
through credit derivatives is especially attractive for emerging markets investors. 
•  Credit derivatives allow investors to exploit illiquid points in the yield curve and 
provide access to points on the yield curve where bullet bonds do not exist in the 
cash market. 
•  Investors can sell credit protection and earn a risk premium on an unfunded basis. 
•  Emerging markets investors can use credit derivatives to exploit relative value 
opportunities, express a directional view on a particular market, take advantage of 
changes in the shape and structure of the yield curve and efficiently monetise 
certain risk characteristics or pricing inefficiencies prevailing in different markets. 
•  Banks can use credit derivatives to hedge loan portfolio exposure, resulting in a 
more efficient use of credit lines and economic capital. 
•  Credit default swap premiums quoted in the dealer market provide a very accurate 
indicative measure of sovereign credit risk. Debt originators can use default swap 
pricing as a tool to assist in pricing new bond issues, while potential investors can 
use default protection premiums as a benchmark for measuring the fair value of new 
debt issues. 
CDSs allow counterparties to buy and sell protection on the credit risk inherent in a bond, 
loan or guarantee/swap counterparty exposure. A key benefit of CDSs is the ability to create 
maturity and credit exposure that are unavailable in the cash market. Aside from CDSs, 
credit-linked notes (CLNs), total return swaps (TRSs) and synthetic collateralised debt 
obligations (CDOs) are the other major credit derivative products. CLNs can be viewed as a 
securitised default swap, whose performance depends primarily on the performance of the 
imbedded default swaps. CLNs appeal to investors who seek customised credit exposures 
but cannot deal directly in the credit default swap market. TRSs are most widely used in 
emerging markets where leveraged investors seek to synthetically own and fund high 
yielding investments without the overhead of investing directly in the underlying assets. In a 
synthetic CDO, securitisation and credit derivative technologies are combined to provide a 
more efficient way to structure CDOs, where the reference pool is a portfolio of protection 
selling positions through CDSs. 
Table 7 







Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, 
Venezuela, Russia, Turkey, 
Bulgaria, Philippines, Korea, 
Malaysia, Thailand 
Chile, Peru, Panama, Poland, 
Hungary, Croatia, South Africa, 
China 
Ecuador, Qatar, Czech 
Republic, Israel, Romania, 
Lithuania, Slovenia, Morocco, 
Tunisia, Egypt, Slovakia 
Source: DB Global Markets Research. 
 
An active credit derivatives market can improve the stability and efficiency of the financial 
system by its pricing and diversification of credit risk. It also provides tools to securitise credit 
risk that will help develop the overall bond market. The flip side is the potential moral hazard 
of the protection buyers and the difficulty of the stakeholders in monitoring the activities. At 
present, there are no developed local currency credit derivatives markets in Asia.  
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Conclusion 
Growing local bond markets and the rapid accumulation of FX reserves highlight the potential 
for active intra-regional local currency bond investment in Asia. For this purpose, the 
availability of standard hedging tools surfaced as a particularly important factor to access 
each bond market. So far, we have observed a couple of basic patterns in the growth of 
Asian FX and interest rate derivatives markets. 
•  FX market liberalisation, although it should be the first step to facilitate cross-border 
trades, remains incomplete in many countries. Many Asian central banks continue to 
prefer the accumulation of FX reserves. Although underlying economic conditions 
are ripe, the signs of further FX deregulation are yet to be seen in some countries. 
Free capital mobility would be helpful in improving market efficiency by attracting 
foreigners to the local markets. 
•  Exchange-traded futures are open in six countries, but except for the three-year 
bond futures in Korea, liquidity is extremely limited. Two main issues are the lack of 
a broad investor base (including foreign participation) and the market-unfriendly 
structure of some products. 
•  In the OTC market, swap markets are either underdeveloped or inactive in many 
countries. Reliability in reference rates and regulatory restrictions could be the main 
reasons. 
The choice between diversity and focus should be based on the maturity of each market. 
While advanced markets like Hong Kong and Singapore may continue to develop a variety of 
hedging tools, most other Asian countries may want to focus on a small number of basic 
products. As mentioned before, interest rate options trade frequently only in Hong Kong and 
Singapore. Although many Asian countries have recently launched an array of derivative 
products, virtually none of them has good liquidity. Generally, investors would welcome a 
simple and straightforward product. In those countries, focusing on a few liquid products 
might be more effective in accelerating market development. 
In this regard, the importance of exchange traded markets should not be underestimated, at 
least for the initial stage. An exchange product can provide players with transparency and an 
efficient price discovery process, and allow derivatives dealers to hedge their OTC positions 
more efficiently. In addition, financial instability may arise in the OTC market when shocks 
such as credit events and sharp movement in underlying asset prices occur. When 
underlying asset prices change rapidly, the size and configuration of counterparty exposures 
can become unsustainable and provoke a rapid unwinding of positions. In general, liquidity in 
vanilla derivatives markets is likely to drive product innovation. Major benefits of exchange-
traded derivatives compared to OTC products are: 
•  no credit exposure with the settlement guaranteed; 
•  transparency and anonymity; 
•  lower transaction cost; 
•  less severe information asymmetry as OTC derivatives activities tend to concentrate 
in major institutions. 
Development of bond and derivatives markets are mutually reinforcing processes. By 
definition, “derivatives” cannot exist without “underlyings”. The transparency and liquidity of 
the underlying markets are the fundamental success factors for derivatives markets. A 
reliable benchmark yield curve should be the main focus for nearly all Asian fixed income 
markets, but probably with higher priority to China, Indonesia and the Philippines. Pricing of a 
derivative product is subject to manipulation without solid reference rates, which will 
subsequently limit the liquidity of the derivative product. Liquid short-term benchmark rates 
are especially important for pricing swaps.  
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Finally, the problem of broadening the investor base is a common theme in most Asian 
derivatives markets. In the case of Singapore and Hong Kong, liquidity in futures markets 
remains low as there are other liquid OTC derivatives. If somehow more participants become 
interested in futures, increased liquidity will likely bring more participants into the market in a 
virtuous circle. In the futures market, the general issue is the lack of ability for market makers 
or dealers to hedge their position in an efficient manner. For example, in Malaysia, if 
investors were to sell dealers a futures position, there is no real way for the dealers to hedge 
their long position by shorting it in the underlying bond market or in the swaps market, which 
is only liquid out to three-years. Currently, investors in Malaysia are mainly banks and the 
Employee Provident Fund (EPF), with life insurers and asset managers being small 
investors. The Malaysian government may need to encourage hedge funds and more asset 
managers to enter the market just as neighbouring Singapore did. In India, foreign 
institutional investors (FIIs) are not allowed to trade in interest rate derivatives while they are 
allowed to trade in equity derivatives. Moreover, large corporates who have the requisite 
skills to manage or take risk are still subject to strict rules on hedging requirements, which is 
hampering the improvement in market liquidity. Policy consistency is another important issue. 
Many Asian governments aggressively introduced exchange-traded derivatives, but they also 
maintain a variety of policies that discourage the demand for derivatives, such as capital 
controls, restrictions on short sales and a lack of accounting or legal standards. In order to 
bring investors into the derivatives market and facilitate sustainable market growth, the 
authorities should consistently improve market infrastructure, enhance monitoring and 
supervision systems and provide a fair and reliable regulatory environment. 
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